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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
JORDAN MARKS, individually and 
on behalf of all others similarly 
situated 
 
  Plaintiff, 
 
 Case No. 14-cv-00348-BAS-BLM 
 
ORDER:  
 
1. GRANTING 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT (ECF 8) 
 
2. TERMINATING 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE THE 
OPINIONS AND 
TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY 
HANSEN AS MOOT 
(ECF 37)  
 
 v. 
 
CRUNCH SAN DIEGO, LLC,  
 
  Defendant. 
 
  On April 4, 2014 Defendant Crunch San Diego, LLC brought a Motion for 
Summary Judgment.  For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 
motion. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 Defendant Crunch San Diego, LLC (“Crunch”) operates gyms in San Diego, 
California, as well as in several other states. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF 1. Plaintiff Jordan 
Marks entered into a contractual relationship with Crunch sometime before 
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November 20, 2012.  Id. Crunch uses a third-party web-based platform 
administrated by Textmunication to send promotional text messages to its 
members’ and prospective customers’ cell phones. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 2:12–14, 
ECF 8. The phone numbers are inputted into the platform by one of three methods: 
(1) when Crunch or another authorized person manually uploads a phone number 
onto the platform; (2) when an individual responds to a Crunch marketing 
campaign via text message (a “call to action”); and (3) when an individual 
manually inputs the phone number on a consent form through Crunch’s website 
that interfaces with Textmunication’s platform. Aesefi Decl. ¶¶ 3–7, ECF 8-3. 
Users of the platform, including Crunch, select the desired phone numbers, 
generate a message to be sent, select the date the message will be sent, and then the 
platform sends the text messages to those phone numbers on that date. Mot. Summ. 
J. 2:22–25.  The system then stores these numbers in case the user wants to notify 
the prospective customer or member of a later offer. Aesefi Dep. 34:22–25, June 
26, 2014, ECF 24-3. On the specified date the platform sends the message to a 
Short Messaging Service (“SMS”) gateway aggregator that then transmits the 
message directly to the cell phone carrier.
1
 Ex. 4, Pl.’s Opp’n. ¶3, ECF 24-6. Marks 
alleges he received three unwanted text messages from Crunch between November 
20, 2012, and October 18, 2013. Pl.’s Opp’n. 3:22–23, ECF  24. This Motion for 
Summary Judgment turns upon the issue of whether or not the platform used by 
Crunch may be classified as an Automated Telephone Dialing System (“ATDS”).  
LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate on “all or any part” of a claim if there is 
an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“Celotex”). A fact is material when, under the 
                                                 
1
 SMS is a standardized protocol for sending short text messages to cellular phones. 
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governing substantive law, the fact could affect the outcome of the case. See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Freeman v. 
Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute about a material fact is 
genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.  One of the principal purposes of 
Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See Celotex, 477 
U.S. at 323–24.   
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.  “The burden then 
shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.”   Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 
(9th Cir. 2006) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). 
A genuine issue at trial cannot be based on disputes over “irrelevant or 
unnecessary facts[.]”  See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 
809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Similarly, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of 
evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient.” Triton 
Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
2
  The party opposing summary judgment must “by [his 
or her] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 56(e)). That party 
cannot “rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his or her] pleadings.” 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).  
When making its determination, the Court must view all inferences drawn 
from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  See 
                                                 
2
 See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (if 
the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment 
by merely demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”). 
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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).  
“Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of 
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] 
he [or she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
255. 
DISCUSSION 
1. The undisputed facts show that Defendant did not use an ATDS to send 
text messages.  
 Defendant argues that the platform it uses to send promotional text messages 
is not an ATDS as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)
3
 of the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (“TCPA”) because it lacks the capacity to store or produce 
telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator. 
Mot. Summ. J. 4:25–28. If Defendant’s system is not an ATDS, The TCPA does 
not apply and summary judgment should be granted, dismissing all TCPA causes 
of action with prejudice. The Court finds that Defendant’s system does not 
incorporate an ATDS.  
An ATDS is equipment that “has the capacity (A) to store or produce 
numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to 
dial such numbers.” TCPA, § 227(a)(1) (1991). 
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) does not have the 
statutory authority to change the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS. The statute 
defines an ATDS in § 227(a)(1). Section 227(a), in contrast to § 227(b) and (c), 
does not include a provision giving the FCC rulemaking authority. Compare id. 
with §§ 227 (b)(2) and (c)(2). Furthermore, § 227(b) and (c) expressly limit the 
aforementioned rulemaking authority to only those subsections.
4
 It is therefore 
                                                 
3
 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory citations are to 47 U.S.C.  
4
 Section 227(b)(2) provides that “the [Federal Communications] Commission shall prescribe 
regulations to implement the requirements of this subsection.” Section 227(c)(2) provides that “the 
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undeniable that any FCC attempt to modify the statutory language of § 227(a) is 
impermissible. The FCC itself adheres to this, using the statutory definition of 
ATDS in their regulations. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(2).  
Even so, the FCC has issued commentary interpreting the definition of 
ATDS broadly as “any equipment that has the specified capacity to generate 
numbers and dial them without human intervention regardless of whether the 
numbers called are randomly or sequentially generated or come from calling lists.” 
In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act 
of 1991 27 F.C.C.R. 15391, 15392 n. 5 (2012) (emphasis in original).    However, 
this interpretation does not bind the courts. In Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 
the Ninth Circuit found the definition of an “ATDS” “clear and unambiguous.” 569 
F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2009). Because it is “clear and unambiguous,” the FCC’s 
2003 statutory interpretation of an ATDS is not binding on the Court. Id.; See 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837(1984). Further, the FCC’s definition is not predicated on the plain language of 
the statute, but is instead based on policy considerations.
5
  
Courts have defined “capacity” in the context of an ATDS as “the system’s 
present, not potential, capacity to store, produce, or call randomly or sequentially 
generated telephone numbers.” Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., 995 F.Supp.2d 1189, 
1193 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (emphasis in original). The Gragg court expressed 
concerns that focusing on potential capacity would encompass many modern 
                                                                                                                                                                
Commission shall conclude the rulemaking proceeding initiated under paragraph (1) [of section 
(c)] and shall prescribe regulations to implement methods and procedures for protecting the 
privacy rights described in such paragraph.” 
5
 Even if the interpretation was binding or convincing, the FCC’s interpretation dealt with 
predictive dialers and not third-party text messaging platforms like the one at issue here. See In the 
Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 
14014, 14092 (2003). The portions of the FCC’s decisions in 2008 and 2012 that Plaintiff cites to 
both refer back to the 2003 FCC sections regarding predictive dialers. E.g., In the Matter of Rules 
and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991 23 F.C.C.R. 559, 566 (2008); 
In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991 27 
F.C.C.R. 15391, 15392 n. 5 (2012).   
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devices and potentially subject all smartphone and computer users to the TCPA, 
which would be an “absurd result.” Id. Because these modern-day devices are 
easily programmable, anyone who uses a computer or smartphone would be 
subject to the TCPA.  Id.
6
  It seems unlikely that Congress intended to subject such 
a wide swath of the population to a law designed to combat unwanted and 
excessive telemarketing. Additionally, Gragg clarified that “sequentially generated 
telephone numbers” are those that are numerically sequential, such as (111) 111-
1111, (111) 111-1112, and so forth. Id.  
“Random or sequential number generator” cannot reasonably refer broadly 
to any list of numbers dialed in random or sequential order, as this would 
effectively nullify the entire clause. If the statute meant to only require that an 
ATDS include any list or database of numbers, it would simply define an ATDS as 
a system with “the capacity to store or produce numbers to be called”; “random or 
sequential number generator” would be rendered superfluous. This phrase’s 
inclusion requires it to have some limiting effect. When a court construes a statute 
it should, if possible, do so as to prevent any clause, sentence, or word, from being 
superfluous or insignificant. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 468 n.13 (2008); Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Aviall Services Inc., 
543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004) (courts are “loathe” to render part of a statute 
superfluous). It therefore naturally follows that “random or sequential number 
generator” refers to the genesis of the list of numbers, not to an interpretation that 
renders “number generator” synonymous with “order to be called.” 
The platform used by Defendant does not have the present capacity to store 
or produce numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, 
                                                 
6
 It is even more concerning that under the FCC’s interpretation, any phone featuring a built-in 
phonebook could have the present capacity to qualify as an ATDS. Any device permitting a person 
to initiate an SMS or voice call from a database without actually dialing the number itself arguably 
has the “capacity to store or produce numbers and dial those numbers [...] from a database of 
numbers.” 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14091 (2003).  
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and to dial those numbers. Numbers only enter the system through one of the three 
methods listed above, and all three methods require human curation and 
intervention. None could reasonably be termed a “random or sequential number 
generator.” Mot. Summ. J. 2:25–26. Thus, because the Textmunication platform 
lacks a random or sequential number generator, it is not currently an ATDS.  
 Undisputed facts show that the system also fails to have the potential 
capacity to become an ATDS. In Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., the court found a similar 
SMS system to be an ATDS because Yahoo! could potentially write new software 
code adding a sequential or number generator to the system. 997 F.Supp.2d 1129, 
1136 (S.D. Cal. 2014). In contrast, here Defendant uses a third-party platform that 
audits its user’s accounts pursuant to an “Anti-Spam Policy.”Aesefi Dep. 60:7–21. 
Textmunication explicitly bans inputting numbers into its system without either a 
response to a call to action or “written consent.” Aesefi Dep. 31:16–5. Therefore 
the undisputed material facts show that even if potential or future capacity is fairly 
included in the definition of ATDS, Defendant’s contractual obligations preclude 
such a finding in this case. Because Defendant’s access to the platform is limited, it 
similarly lacks the future or potential capacity to become an ATDS.  
The Ninth Circuit, in Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs. LLC., deferred to 
the FCC and found a predictive dialer to be an ATDS because it has “‘the capacity 
to dial numbers without human intervention.’” 696 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14092 (2003)) (emphasis in original). The court noted 
that a predictive dialer “‘is equipment that dials numbers and, when certain 
computer software is attached, also assists telemarketers in predicting when a sales 
agent will be available to take calls. The hardware, when paired with certain 
software, has the capacity to store or produce numbers and dial those numbers at 
random, in sequential order, or from a database of numbers.’”7 Meyer, 696 F.3d 943 
                                                 
7
 The 2003 FCC Report & Order describes predictive dialers. In most cases, telemarketers 
program the numbers to be called into the equipment, and the dialer calls them at a rate to ensure 
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at 950 (quoting 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14091 (2003)).  
In Meyer, challenges to the FCC’s authority to interpret the statute were 
waived because they were not raised at the district court level. Meyer, 707 F.3d at 
1044. Here, the Court is able to address the argument and has addressed its merits. 
The Court finds that the FCC has no authority to modify or definitively interpret 
any language in § 227(a) of the TCPA.   
Even though this Court finds the FCC’s unauthorized interpretation of an 
ATDS overly broad, the system present here is factually distinct from the system 
described in the FCC comment.
 8
 Predictive dialers use an algorithm to “predict” 
when a telemarketer will become available to take a call, effectively queueing 
callers for the telemarketer. They are neither the database storing the numbers nor a 
number generator creating an ephemeral queue of numbers. However, database or 
number generator software is frequently attached to automatic dialers, thereby 
creating the “potential capacity” to become an ATDS. Here, there is no potential 
that the system could be modified to include a random or sequential number 
generator, and it therefore does not qualify under Meyer. 
2. Defendant’s motion to exclude the opinions and testimony of Jeffery 
Hansen is moot.  
As in any matter before the Court on summary judgment, the Court first 
determines if there is a dispute of material fact. If not, the Court applies the law to 
the undisputed facts and may grant or deny summary judgment. Here, expert 
testimony opining on legal questions is irrelevant and therefore not a basis for this 
                                                                                                                                                                
that when a consumer answers the phone, a sales person is available to take the call. The principal 
feature of predictive dialing software is a timing function, not number storage or generation. These 
machines are not conceptually different from dialing machines without the predictive computer 
program attached.  18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14092 (2003).  
8
 This Court concurs with the Gragg court that the statutory interpretation suggested by the FCC is 
both underinclusive and overinclusive and should not be relied upon by courts. It is overinclusive 
because any cellular phone with group messaging or conference call features has the present 
capacity to dial multiple numbers from a database, either as text messages or voice calls. It is 
underinclusive because systems could be artfully developed to circumvent the FCC’s comment.  
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Court’s ruling. Expert opinions are only relevant on a motion for summary 
judgment if it helps determine the existence of a dispute of material fact, a situation 
not present here. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Accordingly, because the Court did 
not take into account the expert declaration, Defendant’s motion to exclude the 
declaration of Jeffrey Hanson is TERMINATED AS MOOT. 
CONCLUSION 
 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment and TERMINATES Defendant’s Motion to 
Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Jeffery Hansen as MOOT. The Court 
DISMISSES this matter in its entirety WITH PREJUDICE.    
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated:  October 23, 2014  
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